Al Qaeda in Yemen after Saleh

An article posted on Foreign Affairs today made an argument very similar to the one I made on PolicyMic last month about how Saleh's departure, and even the weakening of Yemeni state government, would affect Al Qaeda in Yemen. Of course, the Foreign Affairs article is much more nuanced, brings more information to bear, fleshes out some arguments, and gives a more thorough treatment of the tribes' role in fighting/sheltering Al Qaeda (AQ). All the same, I was excited to see an actual Yemen expert take a stance similar to mine.
Basically, I made the point that we should not get nervous about losing Saleh as a counter terrorism (CT) partner. It appears that, by his permission to let the US use missile and drone strikes to target AQ, he was a good partner. He was not.

His commitment to CT was nominal, as much as was necessary to convince us he was worth working with, but not so much as to eradicate the AQ threat that brought with it US military aid.

We turned to missile strikes likely because Saleh didn't put in the on-the-ground the commitment required to root out AQ. Missile strikes are short term solutions. You can kill a leader or two, but he will be replaced. It would take sustained on-the-ground operations to grind down the terror group. We weren't getting that from Saleh, at least not after 2006. Saleh's permission to drop missiles on Yemeni territory should not be seen as a positive sign in the relationship but rather as a symptom of what's wrong with it.

It won't matter that whatever government comes next likely won't give us such aerial latitude because we'd ideally like the Yemeni government to bear more responsibility. Perhaps the next government will actually commit to eradicating AQ, and there will be no need for the US to strike on its own.